

for official use only

# FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

REFER TO CIA

CIA REVIEWED 30-Nov-2010: NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION.

## SPECIAL MEMORANDUM

*FOREIGN RADIO AND PRESS REACTION TO  
PRESIDENT NIXON'S SECOND USSR VISIT*

for official use only  
9 JULY 1974

**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

This propaganda analysis report is based exclusively on material carried in foreign broadcast and press media. It is published by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government components.

**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FBIS REACTION REPORT  
9 JULY 1974

## C O N T E N T S

|                                  |    |
|----------------------------------|----|
| SUMMARY . . . . .                | i  |
| I. THE SOVIET UNION              | 1  |
| II. OTHER COMMUNIST COUNTRIES    |    |
| East Europe . . . . .            | 8  |
| The PRC . . . . .                | 13 |
| Other Asian Countries . . . . .  | 14 |
| Cuba . . . . .                   | 15 |
| III. NONCOMMUNIST COUNTRIES      |    |
| West Europe . . . . .            | 16 |
| Asia . . . . .                   | 24 |
| Middle East and Africa . . . . . | 27 |
| Latin America . . . . .          | 32 |

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FBIS REACTION REPORT

9 JULY 1974

- i -

## FOREIGN RADIO AND PRESS REACTION TO PRESIDENT NIXON'S SECOND USSR VISIT

### S U M M A R Y

#### COMMUNIST WORLD

Moscow has provided a highly favorable assessment of the results of President Nixon's visit to the Soviet Union from 27 June to 3 July. Stressing the continuity between the current summit meeting and the two preceding ones, Moscow has hailed it as testifying to the commitment of both sides to the goals of detente and improved bilateral relations.

In official statements and in media comment the visit was described as a "major contribution" to the improvement of U.S.-Soviet relations, and as a further step toward making "irreversible" the dominance of cooperation over confrontation in international relations. While paying due respect to President Nixon's personal contributions in this respect, Moscow professed to see evidence that the U.S. commitment to detente was supported by other centers of political power within the United States, and that this commitment would remain constant regardless of the outcome of the Watergate "complexities."

Moscow's East European allies and Yugoslavia also offered a positive and favorable assessment of the third Nixon-Brezhnev summit, seeing the results as a solid contribution to detente and peaceful coexistence and expressing satisfaction with what they viewed as continued momentum for detente and constructive East-West agreements. Belgrade comment was less effusive than that of the Warsaw Pact allies, viewing the results as being all that could be achieved but lauding the will shown by both sides to continue such regular meetings.

Romanian media treatment was much more limited, and comment was confined to a guarded assessment by President Ceausescu. Albanian media dismissed the third summit as another example of great power "collusion."

Asian communist countries, in contrast with Moscow's allies, provided sparse coverage and comment. Peking, as it had done for the two previous U.S.-Soviet summits, did not report the second Moscow visit by President Nixon until 4 July, when a straightforward NCNA report briefly noted the Moscow communique and major agreements. While offering no original comment, Peking has replayed some critical third party views expressed by Albanian and Mexican spokesmen.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FBIS REACTION REPORT

9 JULY 1974

- ii -

Vietnamese communist media provided only scant reportage and no comment, just as they did for Brezhnev's 1973 Washington visit. A general disdain for the fruits of summitry was evident in a North Vietnamese army journal article broadcast by Hanoi on the eve of the President's Moscow arrival. Moscow's ally Mongolia offered a positive assessment of the summit and detente, while monitored North Korean media completely ignored this summit, a step down from extremely sparse reportage given the first two in 1972 and 1973. Cuban media treated the third summit largely in factual reportage, a single direct comment offering a positive evaluation of its results.

#### NONCOMMUNIST COUNTRIES

West European media generally appraised the third Nixon-Brezhnev summit as less than a full success, on the grounds no agreement was reached on strategic offensive weapons, while acknowledging the usefulness of lesser agreements signed in Moscow. The French media were particularly outspoken with negative assessments; the British media impression conveyed a sense of disappointment; West German commentators, noting that no breakthrough was made in the strategic arms area, discussed the summit's potential impact upon the European security conference and possible U.S.-West European differences on this question.

Available Asian reaction was sparse with the exception of Japan. Japanese comment characterized as relatively less significant the arms agreements from this third summit, while noting that negotiations now had reached the more complex, fundamental issues between the two major powers. Japanese commentators also expressed concern over possible adverse effects upon Japanese interests from U.S.-Soviet agreements. India and Pakistan media dwelt upon the Moscow nuclear test agreement, the former seeing no application to India's recent test and the latter using the agreement as a peg for criticism of the Indian test. Other Asian comment cited the President's Watergate problems as a factor in limiting his maneuvering room at the third summit.

Middle East coverage of the summit--most profuse and favorable in Egyptian media--reflected regional interests, focusing on passages in the Moscow communique dealing with the Palestinian issue and seeing little progress there. Israeli concerns centered on the Soviet Jewish immigration problem and Palestine. The third summit drew very sparse, low-key reportage and virtually no comment from available African and Latin American media.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FBIS REACTION REPORT

9 JULY 1974

- 1 -

## I. THE SOVIET UNION

Moscow has been distinctly upbeat in its coverage of the third Nixon-Brezhnev summit, held in the Soviet Union from 27 June to 3 July 1974. Stressing the symbolic rather than the substantive aspects of the agreements reached, Moscow has interpreted the meeting as a resounding success primarily in its demonstration of the continued commitment of both sides to the course laid out in the 1972 and 1973 meetings. In the documents of the meeting, in Brezhnev's speeches, and in the ample media coverage devoted to the event, the following themes were stressed:

- + The "constructive and substantial" results of the visit were a "major contribution" to further improving U.S.-Soviet relations.
- + The agreements on nuclear issues marked "considerable progress" on the "central" issue in U.S.-Soviet relations.
- + U.S.-Soviet summits are becoming a regular feature of the international scene, contributing to the process of making "irreversible" the dominance of cooperation over confrontation in bilateral relations.
- + Detente is no longer simply a personal policy of the President but is supported by alternative centers of political power within the United States; thus the U.S. commitment to detente will weather any outcome of the Watergate "complexities."

The protocol features of the visit matched the warm atmosphere reflected in the media coverage. Brezhnev went out of his way to extend public courtesies to the President, to a greater extent than during the 1972 visit.

Official reports on the talks portrayed a more important role in the negotiations for Foreign Minister Gromyko this year, along with the leadership troika, while it paid less deference to Brezhnev's personal role than during his 1973 Washington visit.

**MEDIA COVERAGE** Soviet media this year generally conveyed a warmer atmosphere for the President than during his previous visit. In 1972, particularly in the initial stages, media portrayal of the atmospherics was correct but cool. This year the media were more generous with traditional signs of welcome. According to the TASS report of the arrival ceremonies, for example, the President and the Soviet leadership troika were "cheered by Muscovites" along the route to the Kremlin from the airport and greeted with streamers proclaiming "welcome, President Nixon."

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FBIS REACTION REPORT

9 JULY 1974

- 2 -

The President's arrival and departure at Vnukovo airport were carried live on Moscow radio and television. Prominent central press coverage of the visit featured daily frontpaged accounts of meetings, speeches and agreements, with accompanying pictures. Though commentary on substantive issues during the visit itself was predictably light, reports on the inside pages of the major dailies included dispatches from Washington correspondents on widespread support for the President's visit, reports from the Moscow press center and roundups of positive reaction from around the world. Appraisals of the progress of the talks came primarily through reports by TASS director general Leonid Zamyatin at his joint press conferences with White House spokesman Ronald Ziegler.

The President's speech on Soviet television on 2 July apparently got more faithful coverage in Soviet media than was provided in 1972 when TASS as well as central press and radio accounts sanitized some of his remarks--including a statement on the need for restraint by the great powers in supplying arms to other nations. Though once again the speech was not carried live by all-union radio, TASS did disseminate a "full text" of the President's speech, and PRAVDA and SOVIET RUSSIA published the text on 3 July.

OVERALL ASSESSMENT      Moscow's overriding concern as it approached the third summit and its subsequent assessment were effectively expressed by Brezhnev in his 2 July dinner speech:

It will be no exaggeration to say that the political results of our talks are a proof of the determination of both sides to continue to develop and intensify cooperation between our countries in many fields and work in the international arena for detente and peace. This is precisely what we expected from the talks and that is why we express our satisfaction with their results.

Brezhnev was thus affirming that the summit had achieved what he had earlier said, through TASS head Zamyatin on 28 June, was its main requirement: "to demonstrate to the whole world the inflexible resolve of the Soviet Union and the United States to continue along the course that has been jointly determined by the previously adopted decisions and documents."

Soviet analyses prior to this summit had noted that it was unreasonable to expect as many new agreements this year as in the first meetings, which had followed a long hiatus in relations. An editorial in the journal USA had observed that the summit's importance lay in its ability to "create a favorable atmosphere" for implementing existing agreements.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY      FBIS REACTION REPORT  
9 JULY 1974

- 3 -

According to the editorial, "depending on the requirements of the moment and on the further development of bilateral relations and the world situation, new agreements will also become possible and essential." Significantly, the 5 July joint party-government statement approving the results of the talks praised the agreements signed the previous two years and the two leaders' resolve in Moscow this year to "sustain and implement" them before going on to discuss the new agreements just concluded.

Predictably, given Moscow's desire to show progress in relations, the media professed to see signs already after the first agreements were signed that the third Nixon-Brezhnev meeting would be "just as fruitful" as the two preceding it. Commentators were thus able to reject as unjustified what were described as excessively pessimistic predictions on the eve of the summit in the U.S. press. Similarly, commentary subsequent to the summit has criticized U.S. media for emphasizing what was not accomplished rather than the positive developments.

**LEADERSHIP PARTICIPATION**      Unlike 1972, Brezhnev joined Podgornyy and Kosygin in welcoming Nixon upon his arrival at Vnukovo airport on 27 June and in seeing him off on 3 July. Brezhnev also figured more prominently this time in other protocol aspects of the visit. He spoke at the Supreme Soviet-USSR Government dinner on 27 June and at the President's dinner for Soviet leaders on 2 July. Along with Podgornyy and Kosygin, he accompanied Nixon to the Bolshoi Theater on the 28th. In 1972 Podgornyy spoke at the first dinner, Kosygin at the second, and Podgornyy and Kosygin attended the Bolshoi concert.

Progress reports on the talks and the joint documents issued upon their completion accorded Foreign Minister Gromyko greater prominence in the negotiations than during the first two Nixon-Brezhnev meetings. He was listed, along with Brezhnev, Podgornyy and Kosygin, as a primary member of the Soviet delegation. In addition to reports on the talks in Moscow which listed the four as meeting with Nixon and Secretary of State Kissinger, official dispatches also reported separate Brezhnev-Nixon meetings both in Moscow and Oreanda. In 1972, TASS and Moscow radio had also reported talks between Nixon and Brezhnev as well as between the President and the leadership troika. PRAVDA's 7 July editorial on the results of the talks and the party-government approval statement on the 5th gave less prominence this year than last to Brezhnev's personal role in the summit talks, though of course the General Secretary was not accompanied by other top leaders in his June 1973 visit to Washington.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY



FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY  
THIS REACTION REPORT  
9 JULY 1974

- 4 -

BROAD SUPPORT  
FOR DETENTE

Commentary keyed to the summit underscored the broad support for improved U.S.-Soviet relations in the United States, an increasingly prominent feature of Soviet treatment of the internal U.S. picture in recent weeks. An article on 22 June by IZVESTIYA chief editor Tolkunov was notable for his publicizing observations by Senator Hugh Scott that any successful 1976 presidential candidate would support detente and that Congress as well "is pursuing a policy aimed at detente." On the 26th an IZVESTIYA article observed that detente was increasingly "not only a personal policy of Nixon but a policy synonymous with defending the national interests of the United States, valid without regard to political parties or different personalities." As a concomitant of this trend of analysis, Moscow has been softpedaling its earlier intimations that opposition to the President on Watergate was virtually synonymous with opposition to his policy of improving relations with the Soviet Union. Increased appreciation for the role of Congress, apparent in Moscow in recent months, was also registered by Brezhnev in his 2 July dinner speech. He wished not only the President and the Administration but also "the Congress of your country success in translating into life the good beginnings of peace." The 3 July joint communique noted that increased contacts between the Congress and the USSR Supreme Soviet could play an important role in improving relations.

Although some U.S. journalists have made much of Moscow's alleged reluctance to report the President's remarks on his personal relationship with Brezhnev, Soviet media in general accurately reported the President's remarks and indeed commented independently on the theme. The initial TASS Russian-language report of the President's 27 June speech did report him as referring to "mutual" rather than personal relations, but a subsequent TASS English account rendered it accurately. Moreover, PRAVDA carried the speech textually. The President's statements were also echoed directly in an IZVESTIYA article on the 29th which cited U.S. comment on the summit attributing the warm atmosphere surrounding the first day of meetings largely to the "personal relationship" of the two leaders. It also underscored the "importance of personal contacts between Brezhnev and Nixon for progress in U.S.-Soviet relations." Brezhnev, in his 2 July dinner speech, also expressed appreciation for the President's personal contribution.

## NUCLEAR ISSUES

Brezhnev in his 2 July speech contended that, taken together, the arms accords reached this year "signify considerable progress." He affirmed that he had in mind first of all progress in this area in terming the results of the summit "substantial." Comment in the media since the summit has

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

- 5 -

pointed to the protocol to the ABM treaty and the treaty limiting underground nuclear tests as the summit's primary achievements. But it has also defended the summit's contribution to progress at SALT. PRAVDA political observer Yuriy Zhukov, in his regular TV program on 6 July, focused on the "new instructions" that had been worked out for the delegations in Geneva.

Despite Brezhnev's praise for the results of the arms negotiations, there was a hint of dissatisfaction in his remarks as well. In his 2 July speech he acknowledged that the arms package "could probably have been broader." Zhukov reiterated Brezhnev's remark in defending the summit's efforts on SALT, arguing that SALT involved "very complex problems" which could only be solved through a "step by step" approach.

Though most commentary has overlooked the issue, the party-government approval statement, as well as Zhukov, emphasized that progress had been made on the long stalemated issue of controlling chemical weapons at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) in Geneva. The first indication of such progress came in the joint communique's statement that the two countries had "agreed to consider a joint initiative" in the CCD on limiting, as a first step, "the most dangerous, lethal means of chemical warfare." That position on the surface seemed to represent an easing by Moscow of its public support for a comprehensive approach to limiting chemical weapons.

**ECONOMIC ISSUES**      Moscow portrayed the longterm agreement on economic, industrial and technical cooperation signed on 29 June as the most important agreement save the arms accords--as a satisfactory interim measure until Congress approves legislation granting most-favored-nation status and approving longterm credits. A commentator on the 30 June weekly Moscow radio international affairs roundtable stressed its implications: "The United States and the Soviet Union have now firmly agreed on extensive cooperation in the most important field of man's activities." He added that an underlying principle of the accord was that "there can be no infringement on each other's interests, no interference in each other's internal affairs"--charges Moscow has laid to Senator Jackson's amendment to the trade bill.

In discussion of economic issues surrounding the summit, Moscow has made clear its belief that, despite the President's stated goal of independence in energy sources by 1980, the prospects are bright for U.S.-Soviet cooperation in this area. The 30 June roundtable discussion mentioned specifically the possibility of U.S. participation in Siberian gas and oil exploitation. A 26 June PRAVDA article by Yevgeniy Shershnev, deputy head of the USA Institute, concluded that the U.S. would find it "difficult if not impossible" to fulfill its energy requirements without expanding "international cooperation."

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

9 JULY 1974

- 6 -

## EUROPEAN ISSUES

Moscow in its followup comment to the summit has sought to suggest that the United States has accepted the longstanding Soviet demand for a final, third stage of the European Conference on Security and Cooperation (CSCE) at the summit level as soon as possible. It has done so by playing down the conditional nature of the joint communique's statement that both sides "proceed from the assumption that the results of the negotiations will permit the conference to be concluded at the highest level." Similarly, Moscow has all but ignored the communique's passage which said that Moscow and Washington, in cooperation with other CSCE participants, would work "to find solutions acceptable to all for the remaining problems." In line with its pre-summit stand, Moscow has stressed the singular importance of a "successful conclusion" for the conference.

The 5 July party-government approval statement thus stressed only the importance of the CSCE's successful conclusion. It noted that both sides would work from the assumption that the "results of the talks will contribute to the speediest conclusion of the conference at the summit level." By stressing the urgency of bringing the conference to a speedy conclusion, the wording of the approval statement in effect altered the meaning of the communique's language on the timing of the CSCE final stage to fall into line with the public Soviet stand. The communique in fact said only that the two sides were "in favor of the final stage of the conference taking place at an early date."

The Soviet leadership approval statement also ignored the communique's passage on the "remaining problems" of the conference, in keeping with the general Soviet line of denigrating the persistent Western demands for progress in the cultural and humanitarian areas of the conference ("basket three"). At the unofficial level, following the pattern set by the Soviet leaders' speeches preceding the summit, senior Moscow observers in their initial post-summit commentaries have strongly criticized these Western demands on such issues as greater freedom of movement for people and ideas between East and West Europe. IZVESTIYA's first deputy chief editor and West European expert Nikolay Polyakov, appearing on the weekly Moscow radio international observers discussion program on the 7th, asserted that these issues were "secondary." And PRAVDA's authoritative Yuriy Zhukov, writing in the paper on the 9th, according to TASS, charged that certain delegations at Geneva were complicating the negotiations and making unacceptable and irrelevant proposals--complaints which were almost identical to those made by Brezhnev in his election speech on 14 June. Where Brezhnev did not single out the cultural and human contact proposals at Geneva as the contentious issues, Zhukov made it explicitly clear that the "unacceptable proposals" were in this category.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FBIS REACTION REPORT

9 JULY 1974

- 7 -

Regarding force reductions, the leadership approval statement, like that on last year's summit, ignored entirely the communique's passage on force reductions. Similarly, the current approval statement refrained from mentioning the communique's discussion of FRG-GDR relations and the quadripartite agreement on Berlin.

MIDDLE EAST      Limited followup comment on the Mideast passage in the joint communique has reiterated previous assertions that progress toward peace in that region is due "chiefly" to improved U.S.-Soviet relations and the two powers' joint efforts in convening the Geneva conference and securing agreements on troop disengagement. Broadcasts in Arabic have played up the Soviet "initiative" in again obtaining a reference to Palestinian "interests" in the joint communique, Moscow having also taken credit for the similar reference in the communique on Brezhnev's U.S. visit last June. A commentary in Arabic on the 4th promptly offered the Soviet interpretation of this passage, explaining that the USSR and the United States consider the Palestinian question an indivisible part of a comprehensive Mideast settlement, and that by Palestinian interests is meant the "legitimate interests of the Palestinian people and not the interests of the refugees alone."

Arabic-language broadcasts have skirted the statement in the communique that the question of "other participants" in the Geneva conference should be discussed at the conference itself. In agreeing to this language, Moscow seemingly backed off from its insistence on Palestinian representation at Geneva. TASS commentator Kornilov on the 4th went out of his way to demonstrate that the Soviet position on this issue has not changed when he said he had "learned from well-informed circles" that in the U.S.-Soviet summit talks the USSR stressed the need for stepping up the Geneva proceedings, with the participation "from the very beginning" of Palestinian representatives. And IZVESTIYA on the 8th, as reported by TASS, declared that the Palestinian Arabs should have a possibility to shape their own destiny, and went to say that the Geneva conference "can and should become" the most suitable venue for the discussion of their lawful rights.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

9 JULY 1974

- 8 -

## II. OTHER COMMUNIST COUNTRIES

### EAST EUROPE

The President's visit was viewed by Moscow's allies and Yugoslavia as an event which, while not achieving spectacular results in the area of arms limitation, was nevertheless a solid contribution to detente and peaceful coexistence. The visit was uniformly treated as one of a series--"the third summit"--rather than as an end in itself, a series to be continued with Brezhnev's planned visit to the United States in 1975. Reportage on the President's trip included publication in full of the final communique, joint declaration, and arms limitation agreements in the party dailies of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary and Poland. The President's 2 July speech on Moscow TV was singled out for particular praise, and Prague TV carried a three-minute recorded excerpt of the speech. References to the President's weakened position at home due to Watergate were accompanied by insistence that the Soviet leaders would not take advantage of this situation in the summit negotiations. As heretofore, the Watergate accusations were attributed to opponents of detente, in the same camp with rightwing proponents of cold war policies.

In addition to brief reports on the visit, Romanian media carried only one comment--by Ceausescu in an interview published in SCINTEIA. Yugoslav comment praised the visit for furthering detente, but was less effusive than the USSR's European allies and, like Ceausescu, indicated concern regarding big power diplomacy. Albania mounted its standard attack on the summit as an example of sinister "collusion" between the two great powers.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA, Comment in Prague, Budapest, and East Berlin media  
HUNGARY, GDR combined praise for the visit with castigation of  
alleged opposition to the trip by forces in the West  
bent on wrecking detente. Thus, a roundtable discussion carried by  
Prague television on the 6th included remarks to the effect that,  
while the importance of the agreements reached in Moscow was obvious,  
more could have been achieved were it not for such "cold warriors" as  
Senator Jackson, George Meany, and Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn--recently  
interviewed on American TV--who were opposed to "the group of more  
realistic politicians" represented by President Nixon. An editorial  
in the party daily RUDE PRAVO the same day portrayed the military-  
industrial complex in the United States as still unwilling to reconcile  
itself to a loss of "strategic supremacy" in connection with the

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FBIS REACTION REPORT

9 JULY 1974

- 9 -

agreements on limiting antimissile defense systems and underground nuclear tests, stressing at the same time that the failure to reach a "permanent" strategic arms agreement "was definitely not the fault of the Soviet Union." The paper also portrayed Tel Aviv as "upset" by the fact that the joint communique on the visit mentioned "further participants"--the Palestinians--in the Geneva conference on the Middle East. On the 4th, a Prague radio commentary in English praising the visit as an important contribution to the easing of international tensions complained at the same time that the President, in his first statement on returning to the United States, "repeatedly stressed the necessity of preserving NATO."

Hungarian and East German comment placed greater emphasis on the positive aspects of the summit and was less preoccupied with negative Western attitudes than was Czechoslovak comment. Thus, the Hungarian party daily NEPSZABADSAG's Moscow correspondent on the 4th assessed the results of the summit as "all in all, useful and successful," taking particular note of the President's "repeated assurance" in Moscow that he would urge the granting of most-favored-nation status to the USSR. At the same time, a commentary carried by MTI on the 6th remarked that the current spate of U.S. diplomatic activity exemplified by the Moscow summit "can also be attributed to Nixon's being pushed into a tight domestic political corner where he continues to need spectacular" foreign policy activity. The Hungarians, however, in a Ferenc Varnai commentary in NEPSZABADSAG on 26 June, joined Moscow's other East European allies in stressing that the USSR was not taking advantage of the fact that the President's bargaining position had been weakened by Watergate. On the 7th NEPSZABADSAG noted that reaction to the visit in the U.S. was not unanimously favorable, pointing out that an allegedly rightwing UPI commentator had charged that the President was "much too submissive" in the Moscow negotiations. The paper noted at the same time that, with "certain exceptions," reaction to the visit was positive in the noncommunist world.

A dispatch from Moscow correspondent Horst Kaeubler carried by the East Berlin domestic service on the 3d pointed out that the successful Moscow negotiations represented "no easy process," in view of the fact that detente was only two years old. The next day, in an SED plenum speech also reported by TASS, East German party leader Honecker praised the results of the Moscow talks as providing a strong impetus for strengthening peace and security, particularly in Europe. Those in the West who charged that the timing of the summit was inopportune because of the President's "weakened position" at home were denounced as advocates of the policy of strength by East Berlin domestic service commentator Guenter Leuschner on the 6th.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FBIS REACTION REPORT  
9 JULY 1974

- 10 -

The same Leuschner commentary pointed out that the President's trip to Moscow coincided with the visit to Peking by Senator Jackson, "one of the most irate detente opponents." Leuschner had also noted the coincidence of the two visits in a talk on 1 July, as did Prague's RUDE PRAVO on the 3d. NEPSZABADSAG's commentator Ferenc Varnai on 26 June had underscored the kinship between such alleged opponents of detente as Senator Jackson and the Chinese leaders' anti-Soviet, anti-peaceful coexistence policies.

POLAND, BULGARIA Warsaw and Sofia appeared intent on giving a uniformly positive portrayal of the summit and generally avoided any assessment intimating that the negotiations had fallen short of their desired objectives. At the windup of the President's Moscow stay, the Polish party daily TRYBUNA LUDU on 3 July declared that the Soviet-U.S. dialog had acquired the qualities of continuity and consistency, the political climate of the world had changed fundamentally, and that detente had become a dominant trend in the world. Four days later a commentary in the same paper said the results of the summit amounted to "a system of joint or parallel actions by the USSR and the United States, a system which, despite the difficulties it has had to overcome, is irreplaceable for a peaceful normalization of international relations." Another commentary in this issue of TRYBUNA LUDU pointed to the large crowd welcoming the President home as a demonstration that concern for peace "is cause number one for the Americans." It noted in passing that such crowds for the President had been infrequent in recent times due to the Watergate affair, which had been "blown up" by some segments of the U.S. press. In advance of the visit, the paper had asserted on 23 June that Watergate had "no bearing on Soviet-American relations." The Warsaw trade union daily GLOS PRACY on the 4th underscored the importance of the "personal" relationship between the two leaders and noted worldwide appreciation for "the great personal contribution that is being made to the cause of detente by Leonid Brezhnev and Richard Nixon."

Comment on the visit in Sofia media, while relatively sparse, was effusive in praising its results and in emphasizing the role of the Soviet Union in the cause of detente. Thus, the weekly POGLED of 1 July stressed that the third summit was the result of "the highly humane and purposeful policy of the Soviet Union aimed at peaceful coexistence" between different social systems. The party daily RABOTNICHESKO DELO's editorial on the 5th declared that the third summit was "a new and considerable step in the great cause" of detente, and that its documents recorded "fruitful and constructive" results of import both for the two countries' peoples and the world. The Sofia comment included a swipe at such alleged opponents of detente as Senator Jackson, Peking, and the U.S. military-industrial complex, in a Sofia radio talk on the 6th.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FBIS REACTION REPORT

9 JULY 1974

- 11 -

ROMANIA President Ceausescu himself provided the only monitored comment from Romania on the summit talks. Bucharest media limited their coverage to brief reports, duplicating their treatment of the 1973 Washington summit and of the President's recent Mideast visit.

Ceausescu, in a 19 June interview for U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT which was published in SCINTEIA on 2 July, answered several questions about the summit which indicated his concern about big power diplomacy. Commenting on the talks in general, Ceausescu pointed out that any assessment would be "difficult" to make "since the problems that will be discussed there are known only by the two countries." He went on to express hope that the talks would lead to agreements that would not only contribute to U.S.-Soviet cooperation but would also "take into account and contribute to detente, in accordance with all the states' strivings for independent and free development." Asked whether U.S.-Soviet detente might increase the danger of "a tacit understanding" between the two countries to jointly control Europe, Ceausescu replied that "if such opinion does exist in some states, or among some politicians, it is for those countries to demonstrate through agreements among themselves that such fears are unfounded."

YUGOSLAVIA Belgrade was less effusive than the Soviet Union's East European allies, but it too viewed the summit as significant in terms of consolidating detente. On the other hand, Yugoslav comment also reflected Ceausescu's concern about big power diplomacy.

BORBA on 5 July, as reported by TANJUG on the 4th, reflected the general Yugoslav opinion in noting that "as much as was realistically possible has been achieved." That no spectacular agreements were signed in Moscow was played down by Yugoslav commentators as less important than the fact that the summit represented a continued normalization of U.S.-Soviet relations. "Possibly the most important result," BORBA pointed out, "is the accord reached for such meetings to be regularly maintained, for bilateral relations to be carefully fostered, and for all possible efforts to be made toward further cooperation and understanding in all areas."

Reservations about the success of the talks were noted, however, by TANJUG on 3 July in reporting that Brezhnev had said that "the results of the negotiations could have been of a larger scope." Zagreb Radio commentator Milika Sundic on 4 July also noted that the Soviet Union had wanted to achieve more and said that this time it was the United States that was not willing to go further,

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY



FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY      FBIS REACTION REPORT  
9 JULY 1974

- 12 -

but he could not determine if this was because of "Nixon's position in the United States or because of U.S. relations with its West European allies."

Yugoslavia's concern about big power diplomacy was brought up at the start of the talks, when the Ljubljana DELO on the 27th pointed up the need for greater participation in the detente process by "those political and national subjective factors that have so far been rather more observers than active participants in relation to the present summit consultations and accords. . . ." Following the talks, Belgrade radio commentator Bozidar Kicovic on 6 July, noting that the summit results were "limited," added that this fact "only confirms that the possibilities of the two greatest world powers. . . are limited and that these two powers alone cannot carry out the entire task of strengthening and building a lasting peace. . . ."

ALBANIA      Tirana media characteristically portrayed the talks as another example of imperialist-revisionist collusion, charging that the two leaders used the occasion to conclude secret agreements. Referring to the "clamor" surrounding the signing of the summit agreements, Tirana radio on 4 July maintained that the "main agreements" were those reached in secret, those concerning "the continuation of their unbridled arms race, the increase of their nuclear potential and their nuclear blackmail and threats." Furthermore, Tirana claimed, the announced agreements on underground testing and limiting of ABM systems "do not change the essence of the matter." As ATA pointed out on the same day, the underground test ban agreement allows the two countries until March 1976 to continue perfecting their nuclear arms, and the limitation of ABM sites refers only to "quantitative" rather than "qualitative" restrictions.

The authoritative ZERI I POPULLIT on 5 July used the summit to launch a lengthy tirade against both the United States and the Soviet Union, labeling the former as "the main pillar of economic expansion and political hegemony" and the latter as a "beggar" willing "to make one concession after another" in order to receive U.S. "mass credits and technology."

In contrast to its coverage of the two previous summits, monitored Albanian media did not use the occasion to praise the policies of the PRC.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FBIS REACTION REPORT

9 JULY 1974

- 13 -

## THE PRC

Peking responded to President Nixon's visit to the USSR with a straightforward NCNA report released following the President's return home, similar to the treatment accorded previous U.S.-Soviet summit meetings of the past two years. The brief 4 July report noted the U.S.-Soviet communique's reference to the President's talks with the three top Soviet leaders on bilateral relations and on the international situation, and it reported the agreements reached concerning limiting underground nuclear tests and ABM systems and regarding economic issues.

Peking has not subsequently commented on the summit meeting directly, though it has replayed some critical third party comment. An NCNA report released a few hours after its 4 July report on the summit replayed derisive comment by the Albanian representative at the 3 July Caracas Law of the Sea meeting that "the embraces of Nixon and Brezhnev in Moscow and Yalta" would bring no benefit to the world. NCNA on the 7th cited Mexican President Echeverria's observation at a press conference on the 6th that the summit did not assist world peace but reflected U.S.-Soviet rivalry for international dominance.

Coincident with the summit, Peking has offered clear signs that the Moscow meeting does not affect Sino-U.S. rapprochement. NCNA's 5 July account of Senator Jackson's meeting with Chou En-lai made an unusual mention of Chou's request that Jackson convey his regards to the President and Secretary Kissinger. In June, Peking for the first time in over a year had noted a high U.S. official's reiteration of Washington's resolve to continue detente with China, reporting on Secretary Kissinger's remarks at a Washington banquet prior to his departure for Moscow. Peking had similarly endeavored last year to show that Sino-U.S. relations remained on course despite the summit by giving unusually high-level attention to visiting U.S. sports delegations at the time of Brezhnev's visit to Washington.

Marking a departure from its previously more circumspect handling of sensitive Soviet-U.S. issues prior to the previous two summits, Peking recently showed confidence that no summit agreements deleterious to Chinese interests would be reached in Moscow by releasing a series of articles stressing U.S. determination against Moscow's alleged expansionism. A 26 June NCNA report on the NATO summit meeting that day noted that President Nixon's statements of firm U.S. defense commitment to West Europe were taking place just prior to the Moscow visit. Similarly, NCNA accounts of the President's Middle East trip and of Secretary Kissinger's earlier consultations with Soviet officials over strategic arms questions had testified to intensified superpower competition prior to the Moscow summit.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FBIS REACTION REPORT

9 JULY 1974

- 14 -

## OTHER ASIAN COUNTRIES

DRV, PRG Vietnamese communist media have treated the President's trip to Moscow in the same fashion as they did Brezhnev's visit to the United States in June 1973, providing only scant reportage and no original comment. Both Hanoi and Liberation radios on 26 June broadcast identical, brief reports--citing AP--that told of the President's departure from Washington for Brussels enroute to the Soviet Union and that described anti-Nixon demonstrations in Brussels on the 25th urging Belgian withdrawal from NATO. Media treatment of Nixon's Moscow arrival was confined to pickups of a TASS report noting that the President and Secretary of State Kissinger were welcomed at the airport on the 27th by Brezhnev, Podgorny, and Kosygin. The Liberation Radio version added that both sides engaged in talks on the same day. A Hanoi radio report of the 25th, citing Western reports on the House Judiciary Committee's decision to subpoena four more White House tapes, included speculation by REUTER that the President's trip abroad was an "attempt to use his old trick of making a fuss about his activities overseas to cover up his wrongdoings in the Watergate affair."

While refraining from direct comment on the trip, Hanoi continued to indicate its contempt for the fruits of summitry. An article in the June issue of the monthly army journal, TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN--broadcast by Hanoi radio on the 24th--linked U.S. efforts to "contain the revolutionary movement" in Indochina to the charge that Nixon has been "pursuing the so-called policy of detente and the strategy of achieving a balance among the big powers, resorting to insidious and crafty political, diplomatic, and economic tricks in the hope of alienating our people from the forces of peace, national independence, democracy, and socialism in the world." The President's 1972 visits to Peking and Moscow--coming before the signing of the Paris agreement--had gone completely unreported in Vietnamese communist media, although similar indirect criticism of the new East-West contacts had appeared in the propaganda then.

MONGOLIA, DPRK The Mongolian party newspaper UNEN gave favorable coverage to the President's visit throughout his stay in the Soviet Union, according to the MONTSAME news agency. A commentary in the paper's 5 July issue, reported by MONTSAME, stressed the "tangible results" of the summit in reducing the danger of war. UNEN characterized the talks as a "great step forward" in U.S.-Soviet relations and a new step toward achieving irreversible detente. There has been no monitored reference to the summit in North Korean media.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FBIS REACTION REPORT  
9 JULY 1974

- 15 -

## CUBA

The Havana media paid very limited, generally factual attention to the Moscow summit events, with emphasis on Brezhnev's activities and remarks drawn from TASS or other news agency reportage. Havana avoided direct or indirect comment, with two exceptions. On 26 June the Havana international radio service used President Nixon's pre-Moscow signing of the NATO declaration in Brussels as a peg for a short commentary playing the traditional theme that NATO was "a creation of the cold war and anti-Soviet hysteria."

Havana's PRENSA LATINA agency on 4 July offered the only substantive comment on the Moscow summit itself, in a dispatch calling the summit a "further step toward detente" that had taken "significant steps" toward gradually curbing the arms race. PRENSA LATINA noted in regard to negotiations on limiting offensive weapons that "as was expected, the problem is a complex one." It cited the 10-year economic agreement as "perhaps the most significant accord." The summit agreements predictably were hailed by PRENSA LATINA as socialist triumphs, while the United States was blamed for any lack of progress. The dispatch said the limited scope of the new agreements "reveals that the American side was neither inclined nor prepared to go any further, at least for the time being."

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FBIS REACTION REPORT

9 JULY 1974

- 16 -

### III. NONCOMMUNIST COUNTRIES

#### WEST EUROPE

West European media in general portrayed the Nixon-Brezhnev summit as less than a full success, principally on the basis that no agreement was reached on strategic offensive weapons. At the same time there was a general consensus that the agreements which were signed, although not of notable importance in themselves, would be helpful in continuing the useful practice of holding periodic summit dialogs. The French media were particularly outspoken in rendering negative assessments of the summit's results. British media conveyed an overall impression that the results of the summit were disappointing, although there was also some satisfaction expressed that no U.S. concessions were made on arms limitation issues. While noting the failure of a breakthrough in the strategic arms area, West German media discussed at some length the influence of the Nixon-Brezhnev talks on the European security conference and the possibility of differences of view developing between Washington and West Europe on this question. Finnish media provided an exception to much other West European comment, arguing generally that the goals of the summit had been modest and had been achieved. The issue and implications of Watergate developments played a prominent role only in the British, West German, and Italian press, although media in France and the Scandinavian countries also occasionally referred to an increased weakening of the President's domestic political position and to an attendant circumscribing of his negotiating position at the summit.

BRITAIN      The major British newspapers gave prominent coverage to the summit in news reports and editorials, generally conveying the view that although an ongoing U.S.-Soviet dialog marked by occasional summit meetings is desirable, the concrete agreements achieved in this instance were disappointing. With the Watergate proceedings frequently providing a background to comment on the summit, the press generally concluded that the President could not achieve more significant results in the area of arms limitation because of his domestic political position and Pentagon pressure against feared concessions. General approval of the holding of the summit was further tempered by expressions of concern over a perceived continuing expansion of Soviet military programs.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

9 JULY 1974

- 17 -

The DAILY TELEGRAPH, traditionally the most pro-U.S. paper, stated that the President "did well" to get some "limited cooperation" from the USSR on nuclear control and that it was better to come away "empty-handed" than strike a bad bargain on limiting strategic offensive weapons. The TIMES of 4 July stated in an editorial that in a long-term perspective the results of the summit must be seen as "disappointing." The FINANCIAL TIMES of the 4th, although joining in the general attitude of disappointment, expressed gratitude that there were no concessions by the United States in the field of arms limitation. Sounding the only major divergent note in this general chorus, the London OBSERVER of 7 July stated in a commentary that "Dr. Kissinger left Moscow an intensely disappointed man" at not having been able to persuade the President to overrule the Pentagon and reach a more effective limitation agreement on offensive arms.

Voicing concern for European interests, a TIMES editorial of 29 June expressed the fear that "Mr. Nixon might be tempted to buy progress on strategic arms limitation for a concession on Europe." The FINANCIAL TIMES of 5 July, however, stated in a Brussels correspondent's dispatch that Dr. Kissinger succeeded in "smoothing ruffled European feathers" and that "his assurances to his NATO allies muted criticisms which many of the Europeans had prepared on first reading the communique." The traditionally conservative ECONOMIST was pleased that "Mr Nixon's necessities have not forced him to endorse Mr Brezhnev's appeals for an immediate pan-European summit."

FRANCE      French media reportage and comment on the summit viewed it most often as essentially a failure because it did not achieve significant progress in regard to the major issue of limiting strategic offensive weapons. Expressing this general estimate dramatically, a Paris radio commentary on 3 July by Jean-Claude Mangeot asserted that "the arms race is going to continue" and added that "not only has nothing been done," but a "step backward" was taken with regard to establishing a date for reaching a new strategic arms agreement. An article by J. Amalric in LE MONDE on 4 July was more measured, noting that "the sparseness of the results of these meetings should not be surprising and was envisaged by the two parties before the meeting started." LE MONDE also believed, however, that "Messrs. Nixon and Brezhnev set their sights too high and have now been compelled to lower them considerably."

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

9 JULY 1974

- 18 -

The conservative LE FIGARO stressed the "modest nature" of the overall results but at the same time favorably evaluated the summit's significance for "assuring quasi-permanent contacts between the two great powers." The communist L'HUMANITE, stating that the accords limiting ABM sites and underground nuclear testing "consolidate safeguards against conflict and tension," predictably described the summit "a success for active detente policy, including in the military field." A Paris radio assessment of the agreement limiting underground nuclear testing was that it would "not affect the continuation of the American nuclear program." The energy, construction, and artificial heart research accords were dismissed by the media as minor.

References in French media to Watergate were generally confined to early radio and press comment and were not extensive. J. Amalric noted in the 27 June LE MONDE, for example, that "people now realize that, with Watergate's help, the transition from peaceful coexistence to cooperation will take more than a few years." Paris radio, stating that the summit was not a success "for the supporters of disarmament," asserted that this fact in itself was "almost a good thing for Richard Nixon," because there were no agreements reducing U.S. ability to maintain its strategic deterrent.

FRG West German comment on the summit was voluminous throughout the President's visit. Following the signing of NATO's Ottawa Declaration in Brussels on 26 June, West German commentators generally expressed confidence that the President would advocate and represent West Europe's interests in his discussions with Brezhnev, but there was also a strong undercurrent of skepticism over U.S. intentions regarding the CSCE and the West European position on a final CSCE summit-level meeting--a theme which continued after the issuance of the joint communique on the Moscow talks. From the outset many commentators warned that too great expectations for the summit were out of place, and they were particularly skeptical of any breakthrough on limiting strategic offensive arms. Criticism of the summit's outcome was centered on what were generally termed meager results.

The Hamburg weekly DIE ZEIT maintained that this was "a summit meeting rich in ambiguities and poor in unequivocalness. Hiding behind the optimism cultivated by both sides was profound mutual skepticism." SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG charged that the communique's reference to a possible international initiative for the ban of chemical weapons sounded "hypocritical," since Moscow and Washington had been blocking a pertinent agreement in Geneva for years.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FBIS REACTION REPORT

9 JULY 1974

- 19 -

FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU remarked that "apart from the bilateral agreements and contracts which the crippled U.S. President can take home," the world political balance sheet of the visit could not be satisfactory.

The agreements concluded in the first few days of the summit, correspondent Clemens informed listeners of Cologne radio, were "not exactly epoch-making." SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG columnist Hans Ulrich Kempfski declared in a feature on the Oreanda stopover that the statements by Zamyatin and Ziegler "convey nothing more than that fraternization climate expressed during the first and second summit meetings." Several observers ascribed this to the "hard" and "frank" discussions between Nixon and Brezhnev. Adelbert Weinstein, the FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG's strategic-military commentator, claimed that in exchanging information on arms the Americans probably were honest, but not the Soviets. Radio correspondent Ulrich Schiller reported from Moscow that, as never before, "Nixon and Brezhnev let each other have a close look at their armories or, better yet, at their horror chambers, and they left no doubt about the seriousness of the struggle for strategic balance." Thilo Schneider pointed out over Hamburg television that "by his obviously hard attitude in Moscow despite Watergate, President Nixon has not run the risk of jeopardizing the security of the West through sham results and advance concessions." The FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG also noted President's Nixon's promise to the Europeans that he would not let himself be induced by the Soviet Union to make arrangements at the expense of his allies and that, for this reason, one "may quite well rely on President Nixon who, thank God, is not as weak as his opponents at home would like him to be." SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG remarked that the President is in a position again to speak more strongly for the West.

Several observers discussed the domestic political difficulties which both Nixon and Brezhnev had to take into account during the summit, linking these difficulties in particular to the differences over strategic issues. Weinstein opined in one of his articles that "the President knows that he can offer neither to his secretary of defense and the Pentagon nor to influential Senator Jackson an agreement in which the United States makes advance concessions of any import. Consequently, this summit meeting can produce only second-rate results." Christian am Ende said over Cologne's Deutschlandfunk that the margin for a complete agreement on strategic arms limitation was small. This was true for Nixon just as it was true for Brezhnev. "The latter must

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY



9 JULY 1974

- 20 -

take into account the objections of the military leaders or risk his post as party chief. Grechko wants to eliminate the U.S. technological lead, a reason why he wants to gain time. Nixon must not risk the superiority of the United States lest he lose the votes of the 34 senators which he must have for an acquittal in possible impeachment procedures." The WESTFAELISCHE NACHRICHTEN observed that Nixon's hands were tied first by his European allies whom he had reassured in Brussels and second by a growing front at home where, "in the circle around Secretary of Defense Schlesinger, Kissinger's policy of arrangement is being viewed with growing skepticism."

AUSTRIA Most Austrian papers gave prominent coverage to the President's trip, with noncommunist press comment moderately optimistic that some successes would be achieved, particularly in the field of disarmament, despite President Nixon's domestic political problems. Post-summit comment reflected disappointment over what was widely regarded as meager results. The communist press hailed the summit as a full success and a defeat for the enemies of detente.

A socialist ARBEITER-ZEITUNG commentary on 30 June, expressing hope for progress in disarmament, said "it is idle to ask which side is to blame for the accelerated arms race--it is far more important to slow it down. . . . Both the Soviet party chief and the U.S. President, who is badly shaken by Watergate, could do very well with a success."

The semiofficial WIENER ZEITUNG in a 4 July article reviewed the "disappointing" results of the trip but added that "one should not be immoderate. A positive influence of the Nixon-Brezhnev talks on the all Soviet-American relations is unmistakable, and it goes without saying that these relations are of decisive importance for world politics."

A 5 July ARBEITER-ZEITUNG article entitled "A Useful Failure" said that despite the "glossed-over failure" in the field of disarmament, it would nevertheless be wrong to consider the meeting of the big two as useless. The paper added that the President's partial failure in Moscow would tend to help him at home in the Watergate affair, for he made no "dangerous" concessions and did not betray any U.S. interests.

DIE PRESSE on the 5th said in a dispatch by its Washington correspondent that it had been feared that Nixon would give in to Kissinger's "all too great readiness for compromise" in Moscow,

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FBIS REACTION REPORT

9 JULY 1974

- 21 -

but that "Nixon withstood Kissinger." WIENER ZEITUNG declared on the 5th that "as far as SALT and the CSCE are concerned, Nixon has hardly any successes to show," and that "skepticism concerning the optimism displayed by Nixon is intensified by the fact that the Soviet army with its tremendous conventional weapons superiority could wipe out the NATO forces in no time."

ITALY The Italian press was generally unenthusiastic over the results of the summit, but noted on occasion that it helped to maintain the process of achieving detente. LA STAMPA's Garimberti dismissed the 28 June agreements as "mostly ornamental" and evaluated the general economic agreement only slightly higher. Comment on the two arms agreements was also generally negative. LA STAMPA, for example, called them "more formal than substantial." The principal obstacle to progress in achieving strategic arms limitations was viewed as pressure exerted by the military lobbies on both sides.

Much of the Italian press gave prominent play to what was viewed as a linkage between U.S. domestic politics and the summit. LA STAMPA stated bluntly that "Nixon realized that he could make the best use of the summit for domestic purposes by leaving Moscow without any strategic agreements," and some correspondents emphasized that the President's travels could be seen as "a colossal escape from Watergate." Ugo Stille in the prestigious daily CORRIERE DELLA SERA observed that President Nixon had succeeded "in reconciling the different and contrasting factors in the political equation" by reasserting the principle of an indispensable but limited detente.

SCANDINAVIA Finnish media sought to present the summit results in the best light possible, and in this respect were the most positive of the monitored West European media. The main thread running through the numerous reports from the Finnish radio correspondent in Moscow and the domestic press, as cited by Helsinki radio, was that although the agreements reached were modest, they were nevertheless important as a continuation of the East-West dialog. Another theme emphasized was that there should be no cause for disappointment because an agreement limiting MIRV missiles was not achieved, because no one really expected such an agreement at this time. Most comment agreed with UUSI SUOMI, the National Coalition Party's newspaper, which according to a Helsinki radio press review on 4 July said that "the results achieved in Moscow were in no way earth shattering, although the limited goals set for the meeting were achieved."

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FBIS REACTION REPORT

9 JULY 1974

- 22 -

The independent HELSINGIN SANOMAT said that by comparison with previous meetings, the third summit "seemed something akin to routine," but that the significance of such meetings "must not be underestimated," since they give leaders the opportunity to come to know each other better and thus "lessen the possibility of fatal misjudgments." KANSAN UUTISET, the organ of the leftist SKDL Party, said the summit results "are apt to silence the critical voices that were heard before Nixon's trip." The superpower conspiracy has been disproved because none of the results is directed against other countries, it said. SUOMENMAA, the Center Party's newspaper, found it "very important" that the final communique set forth the hope that the third stage of the European security conference "should be held as soon as possible at the summit level."

Swedish press coverage was confined mainly to factual reportage with scant comment. The traditionally liberal DAGENS NYHETER said editorially on 4 July that the U.S. President "did not escape Watergate; he took it with him to Moscow." Placing the onus for the lack of summit success on the President, the paper claimed that he could not achieve much for "fear of the hawks at home." The conservative SVENSKA DAGBLADET stated in its 4 July editorial that the arms limitation accords "have no significance" since both parties agreed to halt tests which were no longer needed. Stockholm radio's general assessment of the summit was that results were relatively modest and indicative of restrictions on the President. Hans Von Frisen, in a commentary on the 3d, noted President Nixon's statement in Brussels that he was going to the summit meeting "without overly high expectations," and then added that this turned out to be "correct." A radio broadcast of the 3rd cited a Swedish research institute opinion that the agreement limiting underground tests "will not mean any great reduction in underground nuclear explosions."

The conservative Norwegian paper AFTENPOSTEN voiced presummit fears that the President would "go too far to score foreign policy points" in Moscow. The organ of the Labor Party, ARBEIDERBLADET, commented that the President could only rely on European support if he acted "as President and NATO representative" instead of "trying to clear himself at home." The agreements that were signed attracted little more than factual reportage. AFTENPOSTEN of 2 July saw the economic agreement as "political cosmetics" and ARBEIDERBLADET regarded the arms agreement as "limited." In a cautionary tone an AFTENPOSTEN editorial on 4 July contrasted U.S. and Soviet media freedom to report the summit and concluded that the kind of cooperation engendered "is not necessarily the same as detente."

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FBIS REACTION REPORT

9 JULY 1974

- 23 -

Denmark's papers gave relatively scant coverage to the summit, confining themselves primarily to factual reports. The liberal BERLINGSKE TIDENDE of 29 June, giving greater prominence to Sakharov's hunger strike than the summit, noted that the summit was characterized by "optimistic rhetoric." Commenting on the outcome of the arms limitation talks, BERLINGSKE TIDENDE of 3 July reported that the two leaders were "at one in the end," after "what a Soviet source termed a 'confrontation.'" The Social Democratic AKTUELT of 5 July stated that the talks were "meaningless" and quoted the director of Stockholm's International Peace Research Institute to the effect that the results of the arms limitations talks were "profoundly depressing and unfruitful" and that Brezhnev and Nixon "have come to an agreement in only one area, which has lost military interest."

OTHER COUNTRIES      Sparse coverage of the summit was monitored from Belgian radio and press sources. The radio provided factual reportage on summit activities but was not heard to comment on the communique or the results of the visit. On 4 July the radio did report Dr Kissinger's remarks to the press prior to his departure from Brussels that he had informed the NATO Council about the talks and that "no secret agreements had been made with the USSR."

Spanish radio comment and reporting was cautious in assessing the summit but ended by viewing it as perhaps unnecessary. On the 28th Madrid radio's New York correspondent cited a long list of what "White House experts" thought would be "logical" for Nixon and Brezhnev to achieve. The same correspondent, after the summit, noted that some agreement had been achieved and that this was a positive result. He added that "some people ask, however, if it would not have been better to use the ordinary diplomatic channels for achieving these results."

A Lisbon radio commentary monitored on 2 July stated that President Nixon's personal position at this summit was weakened by "the many repercussions of the Watergate scandal," but that this was partly compensated for by the success of Dr. Kissinger's diplomatic activities in the Middle East. The U.S. President was "handicapped" by the lack of "platform of American consensus" regarding the "most important issue of all, the limitation of offensive nuclear weapons," the commentary added. Radio Lisbon concluded that the periodic meetings between U.S. and Soviet leaders "never fail to contribute in some way to strengthening this ultimate goal of both countries' policies" of preserving world peace.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FBIS REACTION REPORT

9 JULY 1974

- 24 -

## ASIA

JAPAN Japanese media carried extensive reportage and comment on the summit talks, demonstrating a broad consensus that the Moscow meetings had produced no spectacular results. Most comment tended to deprecate the significance of the accords on limiting underground tests and ABMs, and lamented the failure to limit offensive nuclear weapons or take concrete steps to curb nuclear proliferation. The media showed some concern lest U.S.-Soviet agreements impair the interests of Japan and other lesser powers. Limited comment on the economic and technical agreements signed at the summit noted that these did not assure U.S. participation in Siberian development projects.

Typifying the lukewarm reaction of major Japanese papers to the Moscow talks, YOMIURI on 5 July editorialized that the meetings "were not so fruitful" as the two previous summit meetings held since 1972. While the editorial noted that the "Watergate scandal" may have had something to do with this, it alleged that the primary reason was that the talks are now dealing with "the core of the problems besetting these two countries with their different social, political and economic systems." YOMIURI concluded that the two superpowers "should have set a good example to the world" by announcing a timetable for a total nuclear test ban. A NIHON KEIZAI editorial on 6 July expressed appreciation for the "significance" of the fact that "the framework" for periodic U.S.-USSR summit talks had been established. It concluded that nevertheless "the way toward nuclear disarmament is still blocked" and took note of the superpowers' difficulty in "freeing themselves from the vicious cycle of the nuclear arms race and the tendency toward 'Pax Russo-Americana.'"

An undercurrent of concern that U.S.-Soviet arrangements could damage Japanese interests was reflected in several commentaries. A 5 July TOKYO SHIMBUN editorial cited the "danger" that U.S.-Soviet detente "might develop into 'control of the world by the two powers.'" In the same vein, a 5 July article by NIHON KEIZAI's Moscow correspondent discussed the dangers of the Soviet Union bringing pressure on Japan and West Europe through continuing improvement in U.S.-Soviet trade relations.

Comment in the JCP newspaper AKAHATA, while critical of the summit results, eschewed direct criticism of the Soviet Union. Thus a 5 July AKAHATA report by the paper's Moscow correspondent concluded that while "some people" were attaching importance to the nuclear

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY      FBIS REACTION REPORT  
9 JULY 1974

- 25 -

arms agreements, "Washington is not even seriously thinking of 'restricting' nuclear arms." The report referred to U.S. plans "to control the world on the basis of U.S.-Soviet detente" and pointedly noted that the joint communique "does not criticize" U.S. policies in Vietnam, but like other AKAHATA comment refrained from directly alluding to Soviet actions and motives during the summit meetings.

INDIA, PAKISTAN      Limited comment by Indian and Pakistani media in the wake of the summit has focused on the U.S.-Soviet agreement to restrict underground nuclear tests as evidence to shore up their respective positions on the nuclear testing issue following India's 18 May nuclear experiment. Though there has thus far been no official Indian reaction to the summit, Delhi radio on 4 July cited "official sources in New Delhi" who welcomed the arms limitation agreements while stressing that the underground test accord does not apply to "tests carried out for peaceful purposes." The sources asserted that this position is in accord with India's thinking that there should be "no restrictions on the development of all peaceful uses of nuclear energy by all countries." Another Delhi radio commentary on the 4th similarly testified that the superpower agreement had no relevance for India's 18 May test, since the blast was "of modest yield" and "its purpose was entirely peaceful."

By contrast, Karachi radio on the 4th, in hailing the nuclear test agreement, noted that U.S.-Soviet verification procedures were to apply even to nuclear tests for "so-called peaceful purposes," stating that this shows that "technically there is no difference between a nuclear device and a nuclear bomb." It used this argument to attack India's position on the peaceful intent of its 18 May test, implying that India intends to arm with nuclear weapons and use them for political blackmail.

In general assessment of the summit, Indian comment acknowledged that "no spectacular results" were achieved but lauded the meetings as evidence that the two sides are "settling down to tedious but recognizable norms." In a significant passage focusing on U.S.-Soviet intentions toward China, Delhi radio on the 4th asserted that the joint communique's failure to reflect Moscow's desire to specify that collective security should apply in Asia as well as in Europe reflected "American sensitivity to the Chinese objection" over the Soviet plan.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY      FBIS REACTION REPORT  
9 JULY 1974

- 26 -

**SOUTH VIETNAM**      South Vietnamese media devoted only light coverage to President Nixon's visit to the Soviet Union, providing comment that ranged from critical skepticism in the "opposition" press to occasional guarded optimism in government media. Beginning with the President's arrival in Brussels en route to Moscow, Saigon's government-controlled radio and television carried brief reports on the visit in their daily newscasts. Initial comment in a 3 July radio broadcast, in examining the role of the superpowers in financing wars among small countries, observed in a pessimistic vein that while Vietnam and Indochina were "surely" on the Nixon-Brezhnev agenda, "it is certain that their talks will lead to nothing." A more optimistic radio commentary on the following day welcomed the portion of the U.S.-Soviet communique on Indochina, declaring that the two superpowers have agreed "at least in principle on the need to create a stable situation in this part of the world." The 29 June issue of the opposition paper DIEN TIN linked the visit to President Nixon's Watergate difficulties, citing Secretary Kissinger's remark to a reporter about the trip "proving that the present government is a functioning one." In the same vein, the "independent" DONG PHUNG on the 30th stated that Nixon's "sole choice is to grab the 'buoy' constituted by the international policy of detent" in order to "salvage his tragically declining prestige in the United States."

**OTHER ASIAN**      Republic of China media uniformly expressed doubts about the likelihood of broad U.S.-Soviet agreement, with a 26 June editorial in the UNITED DAILY NEWS going to unusual length to predict that Moscow would endeavor to take advantage of the "Watergate scandal" in order to "blackmail" the President and try to undermine U.S.-PRC "collusion" against the USSR. Australia's national daily THE AUSTRALIAN noted the "Watergate weakness" as a reason for the summit's failure to reach a significant arms agreement and also cited the two countries' "strong military establishments" as significant obstacles. Jakarta radio, by contrast, highlighted on 29 June the positive impact of the results of the summit on President Nixon's domestic political position, a line that was echoed in an editorial by the Thai paper SIAM RAT marking the conclusion of the summit. While Kuala Lumpur radio on 4 July acknowledged that the failure to conclude a major arms control agreement demonstrated that the two powers "have yet to size up the true intentions of each other," it concluded optimistically that the summit had enhanced the bilateral cooperation and consultation built up over the past two years.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FBIS REACTION REPORT

9 JULY 1974

- 27 -

## THE MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA

EGYPT While the Moscow summit talks predictably took a back seat to Egyptian President as-Sadat's parallel visits to Romania and Bulgaria, Cairo media nevertheless gave consistent prominence to reportage on the Nixon trip, with emphasis on the Mideast discussions. At the outset Cairo viewed the visit optimistically with regard to progress on the Arab-Israeli question. Reaction following the release of the joint communique was mixed, however, with comment ranging from disappointment that there was no noteworthy progress toward a "clear-cut policy" on the Middle East to positive assessment of the communique's reference to Palestinian interests and hope for renewed impetus at the Geneva conference in implementing Resolution 338. None of the monitored Egyptian or other Arab comment mentioned the communique's reference to "the right to existence of all states in the area."

In initial comment, the 27 June AL-AKHBAR, as reviewed by the MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY (MENA), stressed that the search for a solution must begin with recognition of the Palestinian people's legitimate national rights, and declared that this was the point which would determine the success or failure of the policy of international detente. A Cairo radio commentary on the 28th noted that the two leaders had to reevaluate their detente policy vis-a-vis the Middle East after their "miscalculation" of the situation at their 1973 meeting in Washington, where they issued a joint statement "which allocated a terse paragraph" to the Middle East.

In a "first quick look" at the communique, a Cairo radio commentary on 3 July said "the policy of detente was not advanced" and the two leaders did not score many achievements beyond their previous meeting in 1973. It noted the failure to achieve concrete accords on limitation of nuclear arms, while also failing to reveal a clear-cut policy on the Middle East. Cairo said the communique "brought nothing new in connection with the Middle East crisis," but called it worth consideration that the communique confirmed "the existence of the entity of the Palestinian people" in its remarks on their "interests," which constituted a "turnabout" in U.S. policy. The commentary complained that the communique should have frankly mentioned the Palestinian people's "rights" rather than "interests" and it should have shown "awareness that there can be no people without a state." The radio also noted that nothing was mentioned about the emigration of Soviet Jews, seemingly to avoid adverse reaction from some U.S. Congressmen who linked the development of U.S.-Soviet economic relations with this problem.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY



FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY      FBIS REACTION REPORT  
9 JULY 1974

- 28 -

Muhammad Sharaf, commenting over Cairo radio on the 4th, dealt exclusively with the Middle East question, noting that the communique put on record a bilateral recognition of the legitimate "rights" of the Palestinian people, which is "one of the results of the great October war and the armed struggle of the Palestinian people themselves." Work toward reconvening the Geneva conference should begin as soon as possible, he said, "so that problems will not pile up again or be ignored," which would certainly lead to the resumption of armed struggle in the area "with all the inherent dangers for international peace and security."

An AL-AHRAM editorial on the 5th, as reported by MENA, asserted that as a result of the Moscow talks "the meeting ground between the two superpowers over the Middle East has grown bigger than at any time in the past," but that "unless practical steps are taken on the road to settlement, the Middle East will remain one of the world's most explosive spots." An AL-AKHBAR editorial the same day, as reviewed by Cairo radio, saw the communique's recognition of Palestinian "rights" as an advance conforming to a trend in the world toward consideration of the Palestinian question as the "core" of the Middle East problem and its just solution as the starting point for peace in the area. The paper considered what it called the "change in terminology" in the communique as one result of the October war, and said this must be followed by recognition of the Palestine Liberation Organization as the only representative of the Palestinians' "interests" and recognition of the PLO's right to participate in the Geneva conference. Cairo radio commentator Sami Hasan Sirri, in a talk on the 8th, portrayed Israel as "dismayed" by the convergence of U.S. and Soviet opinion on the "rights" of the Palestinians--an "essential precondition" for the establishment of peace.

Other aspects of the communique were treated by Cairo media in straightforward reportage. Cairo radio on 4 July did report that the Egyptian delegation to the Geneva disarmament conference welcomed the accord on underground nuclear testing, and quoted a delegation spokesman as saying that the results of the U.S.-Soviet summit in this regard were "useful" but that the two countries still had a long way to go before disarmament was reached.

OTHER ARAB COMMENT      Monitored Lebanese and Jordanian media carried extensive reportage on the Nixon-Brezhnev talks but only limited original comment, which focused on the Palestinian issue and the Geneva conference. The Beirut paper SAWT AL-'URUBAH said on 28 June, according to MENA, that the Arabs expected a "just" stand by the superpowers at the Geneva

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FBIS REACTION REPORT  
9 JULY 1974

- 29 -

conference so as to insure a comprehensive Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories and the restoration of Palestinian rights. Limited Jordanian reaction included press comment reviewed by Amman radio on 28 June which emphasized that big-power efforts to establish peace in the Middle East would benefit U.S.-Soviet detente. In the only available comment on the communique, the Amman paper AD-DUSTUR on 4 July examined the prospects for Palestinian representation at the Geneva conference, warning that this question was a purely internal Arab matter and should not be turned into a "clause to be discussed by the conference," thus opening this "extremely sensitive" Arab question to external interference.

Syrian and Iraqi radios carried Western and Soviet news agency reportage on the visit, but no original comment was monitored.

The clandestine Voice of Palestine and Cairo Voice of Palestine each mentioned the Nixon-Brezhnev summit only once, while the Voice of Palestine programs from Baghdad and Algiers ignored the visit altogether. The single clandestine Voice of Palestine report on 6 July quoted a TASS political observer as stating that the Soviet position at the summit was based on a just peace which could only be achieved by complete liberation of occupied territories and protection of the national rights of the Palestinian people. The broadcast also noted the need for reactivation of the Geneva conference with Palestinian representation, and observed that Israeli press reaction to the joint communique revealed displeasure over the reference to the Palestinian question. The Cairo Voice of Palestine in a 3 July broadcast briefly reported the communique, noting only the portion dealing with the need for a just Mideast settlement taking into consideration the "legitimate interests of all nations in the Middle East, including those of the Palestinian people."

ISRAEL Israeli media, like those of Cairo, carried comment as well as reportage on the visit. Coverage paid particular attention to the possible discussion of the Jewish immigration problem and Soviet dissident Sakharov's hunger strike. Reports on the joint communique, while focusing on the Mideast problem, also emphasized progress on nuclear accords. Comment, chiefly available from Jerusalem radio's press reviews, expressed deep concern over the Palestinian issue.

Official remarks came only from Prime Minister Rabin and Foreign Minister Alon. According to a Jerusalem broadcast in Arabic on 30 June, Rabin in a press conference statement during the Socialist

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FBIS REACTION REPORT

9 JULY 1974

- 30 -

International meeting in London said he "did not believe that President Nixon would make exaggerated concessions at the expense of Israel in order to achieve success in his talks with Kremlin leaders." A 5 July Tel Aviv Israeli Defense Forces Radio account of Alon's remarks at a U.S. Independence Day lecture cited the foreign minister as expressing support for the superpowers' detente policy but pointing out that one of the first tests of this policy "is the attitude of the Soviet Union toward the Jews," and expressing hope for a change for the better in the wake of the summit talks. Jerusalem radio on the 9th reported that Alon, in a statement to the Israeli cabinet on the 7th, stressed the "possible negative interpretation of the different formulations" in the Middle East section of the joint communique as compared with previous ones.

Even at the beginning of the visit, Israeli press comment evinced apprehension over the Palestinian question. The Jerusalem radio press review on 27 June reported YEDI'OT AHARONOT's concern that Brezhnev would try to extract concessions on the Palestinian issue and U.S. guarantees that the Soviet position in the Middle East would not be affected--"all this while disregarding the suppression of Jews in the Soviet Union." The radio's 28 June press review cited a HAZOFE remark that the President's commitment to grant Israel long-term security obliged him to oppose the Kremlin stand on recognizing Palestinian rights. A MA'ARIV report on the 28th by its correspondent in the United States said President Nixon went to Moscow to divert U.S. public opinion from the Watergate scandal as well as to prevent deterioration of the U.S.-Soviet detente policy, "which for the time being appears doomed to failure. . . because the American public doubts his motives."

Six out of seven papers reviewed by Jerusalem radio on the 4th were openly critical of the results of the summit. DAVAR voiced concern over support for the Palestinian issue at a time when terrorist activities were obstructing a settlement. HAZOFE said President Nixon's failure to attain substantial achievements might have "pushed him to meet the Russians half-way over issues in our region." ISRAELSKI FAR said a hero's welcome would not be awaiting the President on his return to Washington, while YEDI'OT AHARONOT declared that the summit probably would "even aggravate tension in the relations between us and the Arabs" because Brezhnev succeeded in "squeezing commitments from a weakened Nixon regarding the rights of Palestinians." The paper concluded that the summit ended in a draw for the United States and a "clear loss" for Israel. In Jerusalem radio's 5 July press review, HADSHOT ISRAEL was quoted as saying that the summit accord

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FBIS REACTION REPORT

9 JULY 1974

- 31 -

on Palestinian rights showed that "small countries are used as objects in business deals between the superpowers."

CYPRUS, GREECE, TURKEY, IRAN      There has been virtually no monitored comment from this area other than a Teheran radio commentary on 29 June and a favorable editorial on revived hopes for world peace in the Cyprus communist party organ KHARAVYI on 4 July. Reports on the summit were prominently featured in radio newscasts throughout the visit. Greek, Turkish and Cypriot newspapers and radios, including the Turkish-language press of Cyprus, generally emphasized the benefits of the nuclear accords for world peace and noted the summit's impact on improved U.S.-Soviet relations.

The Teheran radio commentary summed up the anticipated agenda of the talks, remarking that undoubtedly one of the main objectives would be to find a way to implement the agreements concluded earlier. The commentary said that diplomatic attempts by the United States, and "to some extent" by the USSR, to end the Middle East dispute provided a good reason for the two countries' willingness to continue detente.

NORTH AFRICA      The North African radios carried factual reportage on the visit but monitored comment was limited. From Libya, a Tripoli radio commentary on 27 June called the summit talks an "influence-sharing operation" and criticized detente as aimed at dividing the world into spheres of influence. Tripoli claimed that U.S. efforts to settle its differences with Western Europe and to play a role in the Arab area--"described by most observers as a return of U.S. influence"--represented two deliberate American steps prior to the summit "so that the Soviet Union's acceptance of the fait accompli during the talks would constitute recognition of American leadership in the world."

An Algiers radio commentary on 4 July focused on what it saw as the main issue, "limitation and control of multiple-warhead missiles," observing that on this question "things did not go as well as expected." In Tunisia, L'ACTION asserted that detente "is marking time." A LA PRESSE commentary on 28 June warned of the "risk" that U.S.-Soviet cooperation could lead to the "creation of a condominium" as soon as fear of an armed conflict ended between the two superpowers. LA PRESSE concluded that U.S.-Soviet cooperation should not "ignore other nations and the interests of other peoples." From Morocco, LE MATIN of 30 June carried an unsigned article by the Soviet news agency

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FBIS REACTION REPORT

9 JULY 1974

- 32 -

NOVOSTI denying "collusion between the two giants," pointing to "imperialist aggressiveness" in the recent past and stressing the Soviet leaders' desire for detente.

OTHER AFRICAN COMMENT For the most part, sub-Saharan coverage of the Moscow trip was limited to straightforward news reports, with sparse comment monitored from South Africa, Nigeria, and Ghana. Johannesburg was the most reserved, with a radio commentary on the 4th noting that the President had made it clear to the Soviets that the United States would not "work for a structure of peace at the expense of traditional allies," and another broadcast the following day cautioning that the balance of power underlay detente and warning against being "deceived or soon disappointed" in the wake of the U.S.-Soviet reaffirmations of their faith in detente.

Comment from Nigeria and Ghana emphasized the importance of President Nixon's efforts to promote international peace and Soviet-American cooperation, but also took note of the President's domestic problems. This generally positive view was reflected, for example, in a 30 June article by a columnist in the Nigerian paper, the Benin SUNDAY OBSERVER, which stressed the importance of the trip and detente for such areas as the Middle East and observed that U.S. "cynicism," reflected in Senator Jackson's criticism of the Administration, "should not be allowed to hamper the new understanding between the Kremlin and Washington." The Ghanaian paper DAILY GRAPHIC, as reviewed by a 5 July Accra broadcast, stressed President Nixon's personal effort to establish detente while commenting that "it would be sad indeed" if he returned to a hostile environment and possible removal from office "only to be replaced by another president, who might probably destroy the good foundation laid."

## LATIN AMERICA

Latin American media provided regular news reports on the President's visit but little comment. Factual reportage treated the trip as a routine international news event, overshadowed by major regional developments such as Argentine President Peron's death and the Law of the Sea Conference in Caracas, as well as the World Cup soccer matches. Three negative themes characterized the minimal comment: The two superpowers were perceived as lacking concern for Latin America; President Nixon's emphasis on the personal character of the U.S.-Soviet relationship was contrasted with Brezhnev's warning that personal relationships are not sufficient for the success of

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FBIS REACTION REPORT

9 JULY 1974

- 33 -

international detente; and the lack of any strategic arms accord was stressed.

Colombian papers expressed some cautious optimism, counter-balanced by skepticism about the superpowers' intentions and criticism of the lack of concern for Latin America. A column in Bogota's EL TIEMPO on 29 June reported "a good climate" for detente in Moscow and communist newspaperman Pedro Clavijo, writing in EL ESPECTADOR of 30 June, emphasized that detente would benefit Latin America as funds now spent on arms would be "used to assist the world's less developed countries." An editorial in Bogota's EL TIEMPO of 27 June focused on Washington's general "policy of indifference" toward Latin America, noting that it was waiting to see if there would be new interest "once the U.S. concern for. . . agreement with the USSR had passed."

The Bogota Domestic Service in a similar vein reported that Nixon and Brezhnev admitted that they failed to reach agreement on nuclear arms and "contented themselves with minor agreements." An editorial in Bogota's EL TIEMPO on 1 July also focused on the nuclear arms race as the central point of the talks, commenting that "a solution to this matter or its negative abandonment will mark the level of success of the trip," without a solution, it said Nixon's trip would be just another "courtesy visit."

Mexico's international service observed on 2 July that Nixon and Brezhnev had been "unable to agree on limitation of strategic nuclear arms." Panama City Televisora Nacional and Guayaquil Compania Radiodifusora del Ecuador on 3 July both cited Moscow observers who said that the summit meeting had been "a virtual failure" due to the military intransigence on both sides which thwarted a nuclear arms accord.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**